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Pity the poor patent troll, that hapless creature who would sneak out
from its dark home to terrorize law-abiding corporations with patents of
suspect worth.' Fortunately for the good corporate citizens of the world,
the U.S. Supreme Court, targeting these trolls by name, took away one
of the major weapons used to hold up infringers-the injunct . 2of he ajo wepon   ri erstheinjun ion. Before
the unanimous decision in eBay v. MercExchange, patent holders were
almost always granted an injunction against an infringer. In fact, the
Federal Circuit, in deciding eBay, noted that, upon a finding of in-
fringement, an injunction would issue unless there were extraordinary
circumstances.3
• J.D., expected May 2007, the University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D., Chemis-
try, Princeton University; B.A. Chemistry and Art History, Rice University. Many thanks to
Laura Appleby and Stanislav Dolgopolov for their help.
1. The term "patent troll" was coined in 2001 by Peter Detkin, then a lawyer at Intel,
to describe "companies 'that try to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practic-
ing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced."' Alan Murry, War
on 'Patent Trolls'May Be Wrong Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2006, at A2. Ironically, Detkin
is now the head of a company that falls under his definition of a troll. Id. But see James F.
McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: an Alternative View of the Function
of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006) (providing a more favorable
analysis of the role patent trolls play in the market for patents).
2. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), modi-
fied, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
3. See eBay, 401 F.3d at 1338 ("Because the 'right to exclude recognized in a patent is
but the essence of the concept of property,' the general rule is that a permanent injunction will
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The Court, in a brief opinion, disagreed with the Federal Circuit and
explained that the injunction issue in a patent case must be analyzed un-
der the traditional four-factor test.4 This test was described as follows:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test be-
fore a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in eq-
uity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction
After laying out the four-factor test, the Court noted that "[n]othing
in the Patent Act indicates that Congress intended such a departure. To
the contrary, the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions 'may'
issue 'in accordance with the principles of equity.' ,,6 Since both the dis-
trict court and the Federal Circuit applied a "categorical rule"-a rule
against patent trolls in the district court, a rule for patent injunctions in
the Federal Circuit-the Court remanded the case so the four-factor test
could be applied.7
The practical effect of requiring the four-factor analysis is that patent
trolls now have less bargaining power.8 Without the threat of an injunc-
tion-and faced with the alternative of court-determined damages-the
troll is forced to the bargaining table to negotiate. 9 Of course an injunc-
tion could still issue, however, the four-factor test seems to cut against
the troll and in favor of the infringer:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an in-
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged." (quoting Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
4. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
5. Id. at 1839.
6. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283).
7. Id. at 1840-41.
8. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Michael J. Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509
(2002) (discussing opportunistic intellectual property litigation).
9. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 ("[Ain injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions
arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees.").
See also Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 630 (2005) (ar-
guing that injunctions create thriving market for patent trolls); Carl Shapiro, Injunction, Hold-
Up, and Patent Royalties (Univ. of Cal, Berkeley, Competition Policy Ctr. Paper No. 06-062,
2006) (presenting a model that analyzes the injunction problem), available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1062&context=iber/cpc.
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junction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations,
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the in-
fringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.' °
Is the four-factor test fairer or better than the Federal Circuit's near-
automatic injunction rule? It is certainly more difficult to administer a
factor test as compared to a bright-line rule. On the other hand, district
courts undertake this type of inquiry all the time, although the inquiry is
not usually in the context of the complex world of patents and incentives
to innovate. At least one member of the Supreme Court, Justice Ken-
nedy, seemed to believe that this change would primarily affect patent
trolls." Of course this statement expressly ignores the opinion of Justice
Thomas who noted that special consideration might be appropriate when
the patentee is a university or small inventor.'
2
A. Distinguishing Universities from Patent Trolls:
Active Innovation Matters
The problem with a "one-size-fits-all" remedy in patent litigation is
that there are numerous players in different positions. Patent trolls are
certainly infamous players within the patent litigation world, but they are
not the only players., Inventors who fail to practice an invention may still
seek to enforce their rights for many reasons besides being a troll.' 3 This
motivation probably led Justice Thomas to suggest that universities
should be treated differently: "[S]ome patent holders, such as university
researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license
their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing neces-
sary to bring their works to market themselves.' ' 4 Implicit in this
suggestion is the idea that universities are holding to the bargain set forth
in the U.S. Constitution' 5-- exclusivity in exchange for disclosure of in-
novation-and should not be denied an injunction.
Of course the hordes of trolls also hold to the letter of this bargain.
These trolls disclosed their innovation and received a valid patent. In
eBay, for example, the jury found MercExchange's patent valid and in-
fringed.'6 In fact, the jury found that eBay willfully infringed the patent.'
7
In this situation, it certainly seems like eBay is the wrongdoer. So why
10. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1840 (suggesting that a categorical rule against patent troll-like behavior
would punish small inventors and universities).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
16. eBay, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
17. Id. at 701.
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does it feel so right to limit the ability of the patent troll to enforce its
rights? The answer comes from the sense of injustice that accompanies
the injunction granted to MercExchange.18 Whereas we want to aid a
university to protect its intellectual property against a large corporation,
we have little innate sympathy with a troll attempting to hold up an es-
tablished firm that is just trying to run its business. The feeling is
perhaps compounded when the defendant in the patent infringement suit
is a company like eBay, which is beloved by consumers and collectors
around the world for the amazing volume of trinkets it sells. 9
But, again, there is a problem. Though a patent troll might be less
likable than eBay or a university, the affability of the patent holder does
not make a patent facially more (or less) valid than any other patent.
While trolls might assert patents that are objectively of dubious quality,
any issued patent gets the same presumption of validity and requires the
same burden of clear and convincing evidence to overturn. ° In fact, from
a distance, university behavior looks troll-like since they collect patents
and license them out to firms rather than bringing a product to market. If
a company refuses to obtain a license, universities are no strangers to
litigation.2' There must be something more than the popularity of the
patent holder if the judiciary should, as suggested by the Court, grant
injunctions to universities but not to trolls.22
One way society can justify granting an injunction to a university is
to recognize that it is engaged in ongoing and expensive research. 23 As a
result, a university should be allowed to reap the fruits of the labors of its
graduate students in part because they will pay for the next generation of
graduate student stipends, lab facilities, and science buildings. In fact,
the Bayh-Dole Act encourages universities to profit from the commer-
cialization of their inventions by others. 24 The purpose of the Act was to
18. The district court declined to award attorney's fees or enhanced damages for the act
of willful infringement. Id. at 721-22.
19. See, e.g., Rob Hof, What Is It About eBay's Ads?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 23, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.conVthethread/techbeat/archives/2005/10/what-is-it abou-1.html.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2001).
21. For example, Columbia University has been involved in a number of patent cases.
See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Columbia Univ. Patent Litig., 330
F. Supp. 2d 18 (D. Mass. 2004); Biogen, Inc. v. Columbia Univ., 332 F Supp. 2d 286 (D.
Mass. 2004); Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 150 E Supp. 2d 191 (D. Mass
2001).
22. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
23. For example, the National Institutes of Health, a part of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, doles out tens of billions of dollars in research grants each year.
See Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci., NIH 'Soft Landing' Turns Hard in 2005 (Feb. 20,
2004), http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/nih05p.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2001).
increase collaboration between private firms and research universities by
granting intellectual property rights for discoveries made during gov-
ernment-funded research.25 The result of this Act is more patenting at the
university level and more investment in technology transfer offices to
exploit the intellectual property rights. Given the background of the
Bayh-Dole Act, it might make sense to treat universities differently. In-
tuitively, it seems much fairer to give increased bargaining power to an
entity that is likely to take any gains and reinvest them into research. In
contrast, a patent troll will pocket his ill-gotten gains, removing the prof-
its from the innovation system, and leaving it worse off than before.
The undeniable fact is that universities are active innovators, while
patent trolls, almost by definition, are not. Given the four factors of the
injunction test, this difference is key. A court might forgive a university
for not commercializing and practicing the invention because it exists to
conduct research, not run a business. A patent troll does not receive the
benefit of the doubt in this regard. Instead, the troll exists to extract
profit from companies who actually use the invention, thereby giving the
full benefit of a commercialized product to society.27 With a university,
extracting profits from an active company via licensing does not seem all
that bad because of the assumption that society will benefit further inno-
vation, and such licensing is explicitly encouraged by the Bayh-Dole
Act. With a patent troll, it just looks like a windfall.
But is there anything wrong with a windfall, even if it is going to a
troll? One argument is the flipside of the justification for allowing uni-
versities the right to hold up infringers. Since the troll is taking money
away from entities that might engage in innovation and, therefore, reduc-
ing innovation going forward, society should discourage this behavior.
There might be something to this argument, but it does not fit well in all
situations. eBay, for example, is not an especially active developer of
technology. Despite the obviously technology-centric nature of the firm,
eBay probably consumes far more intellectual property than it generates."
25. Id. § 200.
26. See Cornell Center for Technology, Enterprise, and Commercialization, Bayh-Dole,
http://www.cctec.cornell.edu/cctec/about/history/bayhdole/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 1,
2006) ("Prior to Bayh-Dole, fewer than 250 U.S. patents were issued to universities each year.
Since 1993, U.S. universities participating in the Survey have averaged more than 1,600 U.S.
patents annually. In recent years, patents issued to U.S. universities have exceeded 2,000").
27. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (quoting FED.
TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 37 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
innovationrpt.pdf).
28. A search for "eBay" on the USPTO website reveals that eBay is the assignee on 18
patents. http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).
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Should we really care if a patent troll is extracting money from a firm
that is not really engaged in innovation?
The answer is a resounding yes, though not simply because trolls
are inherently horrible creatures. The reason why an injunction was so
problematic in eBay was because the patent constituted a small part of
the overall business. 29 An injunction would give MercExchange the
right to hold eBay's entire business operations hostage, thereby in-
creasing the bargaining power far beyond what is reasonable. ° While
there is nothing wrong per se with a windfall, it would be too large
relative to the technological contribution of MercExchange's patent. In
other words, the value of MercExchange's innovation to society was so
miniscule in comparison to the bargaining position that results from an
injunction as to make the situation unjust.
3'
But eBay was an infringer, and a willful one at that. Why should
one have sympathy for eBay? In reality, sympathy has no part in this
analysis. Instead, it is the structure of the industry that yields this re-
sult. Assume, for a moment, that eBay practices a series of ten patents,
nine licensed and one-unknown to the company-unlicensed, to run
its site. Now assume that these patents are of approximately equal
value to eBay, that is to say the firm would pay one unit to license each
patent, for a total cost of nine units (ten units minus one unit for the
unlicensed patent).32 eBay, because of its hard work and ingenuity, is
able to take these ten innovations, valued at ten units (though it is only
paying nine units), and turn the combination into a product valued at
100 units. The profit, assuming this is the only cost to eBay, is ninety-
one units.
Now that eBay is successful, the patent troll senses the opportunity
for profit. The patent troll brings a suit, and eBay loses. The just out-
come here seems to be paying the troll one unit, or perhaps even a little
more, say two or three units, or maybe even one tenth of the value of
the product commercialized by eBay, ten units. Getting three (or ten)
times the market rate for the patent makes litigation look very worth-
29. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 ("When the patented invention is but a small compo-
nent of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate
for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.").
30. Id.
31. Id. See also id. ("The potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of these
[business method] patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.").
32. In the alternative, one could simply assume that the market price for each of these
patents is set at one unit because there are alternative technologies that could be used. It is
important to remember that just because a patent exists does not mean the firm has power in
the relevant market. A patent holder could face competition from any number of firms if sub-
stitute technologies are available.
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while. However, a patent troll with an injunction in hand is in a posi-
tion to demand far more.33 Since each of the ten patents is required for
eBay's product, an injunction against the use of any one of those ten
patents can shut down eBay completely. 4 This means eBay forgoes
ninety units of profit (after deducting for the missing patent). How
much is eBay willing to pay the troll to keep operating? Rationally,
eBay will pay up to ninety units, although the actual figure could be
much smaller. This is a classic holdup problem, which carries with it
all the associated transaction costs from bargaining."
Perhaps more harmful is the fact that the troll is rewarded far be-
yond the value of his innovation. The patent system exists to spur
innovation. It does so by providing monopoly rights to an inventor as
an incentive to innovate.36 The value of these rights is both the incen-
tive and the reward for innovation. If inventors can guess the value of
these rights, they will invest an optimal amount in innovation, thus
minimizing the social costs and maximizing the social benefits.37 Patent
trolls ignore this bargain. By demanding and obtaining far more than
the value of his patent, a troll is simply engaging in wasteful rent-
seeking.38 There is no social benefit to this type of behavior. Thus our
intuition that patent trolls are doing bad things is confirmed and deny-
ing an injunction helps society avoid giving an incentive for troll-like
behavior.39
The example above also illustrates several reasons why we should
not be especially concerned when a court opts for damages instead of
an injunction. First, patents are all about incentives, and incentives
mean money. The right to exclude is not worth much to a patent troll
33. This consideration was part of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in eBay: "When
the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations...." eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006).
34. For a detailed study on this type of patent holdup, see Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking (May 31, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/stacking.pdf.
35. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 865-66 (1990) (discussing the effect of patent holdups).
36. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv.
1575, 1595-1630 (2003) (discussing various theories of patent law),
37. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L.
REv. 1031, 1057 (2005) (arguing that "[ilntellectual property rights are justifiable only to the
extent that excludability does in fact create value").
38. Meurer, supra note 8, at 509.
39. See generally Meurer, supra note 8 (discussing possible solutions to opportunistic
litigation).
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who is not actually practicing the invention.40 Thus, the value of the
patent should be a good substitute for the right to exclude .
Second, we might be wary about the judiciary's ability to determine
the actual value of a patent. After all, we are dealing with a system de-
signed to give incentives for innovation. If a court cannot accurately
value a patent, then it is liable to give too much or too little incentive for
innovation. However, a court is almost certainly going to get closer to
the actual value of the patent than the patent troll will. In the example
above, the troll could extract up to ninety times the actual value of the
patent. A court is likely to be able to guess a rough value for a patent;
even if the value is off by 100 percent or more, it is likely to be far closer
than what a troll might bargain for with an injunction in hand.4 Thus, it
appears that the four-factor test really is a good idea, especially for situa-
tions like eBay.
B. The Pharmaceutical Firm as Patent Troll:
SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex
Now on to a more difficult question: if trolls are doing bad things,
why does the pharmaceutical industry come down opposite to eBay on
this issue?4 At first glance, it seems like large pharmaceutical firms have
as much, or more, to lose from patent trolls as eBay. After all, no other
industry depends as much on patents as the pharmaceutical industry.46
This intuition is also confirmed by the brief filed by the pharmaceutical
industry in support of MercExchange-the eBay troll-that extolled the
virtues of strong patent rights.47
40. This statement may or may not be true as a general matter. For example, the right to
exclude may make an exclusive license more valuable. This argument assumes that a party not
practicing an invention has no preference for the right to exclude as opposed to the monetary
value of that right, i.e., the license price.
41. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) ("When the
patented invention is but a small component of the product... and the threat of an injunction is
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement ... ").
42. Determining the value of a patent may be difficult in general. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. EcoN. PERSP., Spring 2005, at 75, 80-83
(comparing patents to lottery tickets).
43. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 36.
44. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 866 n. 117 (discussing how the social harm
that can come from a patent holdup).
45. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing of Amer-
ica in Support of Respondent, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130), 2006 WL 622122 [hereinafter Brief of PhRMA].
46. EM. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in I B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH Eco-
NOMICS 1297, 1317 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
47. Brief of PhRMA, supra note 45, at 2.
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On one hand, given their dependence on patents, it seems obvious
that the pharmaceutical industry would want strong patent rights. On the
other hand, it is somewhat confusing to see them come down on the
same side as the non-innovating patent troll in eBay. The main reason for
the pharmaceutical industry's interest in preserving the automatic injunc-
tion rule set out by the Federal Circuit stems from the difference
between typical products in the pharmaceutical and information technol-
ogy industries. Whereas a firm like eBay utilizes a number of different
patents in its product, thus giving rise to the opportunity for a troll to
extract more than the actual value of a patent, a pharmaceutical firm can
ensure market exclusivity for a drug with a single patent on the active
molecule. 8 Moreover, the cost of identifying putative drug molecules,
including maintaining a laboratory, obtaining the chemical inputs, and
disposing of chemical waste, are far higher than in the information tech-
nology industry, where costs might be limited to a single computer.49 As
a result, there are fewer potential unknown patent holders, and it is easier
for firms to avoid unwitting infringement of a patent.0 Finally, given the
enormous investment firms must make to bring a drug through clinical
trials, there is an incentive for pharmaceutical firms to ensure that their
target molecule is not covered by another patent'
Thus, it seems unlikely that pharmaceutical companies are subject to
troll-like behavior. Instead they have a different adversary-the generic
drug industry. Due to a provision in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
branded and generic firms are constantly fighting battles over infringe-
ment. 2 In this battle, an injunction provides pharmaceutical firms with
the ultimate weapon to maintain their market position and keep competi-
tors from the market. 3 However, some aspects of the branded
48. For an example of how a single patent can be used to exclude competitors from the
market for a drug, see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 E3d 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
49. According to one estimate, in 1990, the pharmaceutical industry as a whole spent
roughly $8 billion on research and development. Scherer, supra note 46, at 1307.
50. There are fewer than 40 members of PhRMA. PhRMA, Member Company List,
http://www.phrma.org/about-phrma/member-company-list/members/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2006).
51. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration estimates that it takes an average of 8.5
years for a drug to go from development to market. FDA New Drug Development Timeline,
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/graphics/newdrugspecial/drugchart.pdf (last visited Nov, 5, 2006).
The time to bring a product to market in the information technology industry is obviously
much less. This can lead to situations where infringing products are brought to market before
a patent application is even published.
52. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 5050), 21 U.S.C. 3550) (1999).
53. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1048-
50 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by designation), aff'd on other grounds, 365 F.3d 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated by reh'g en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), remanded to 403
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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pharmaceutical industry's use of patents appear more trollish than the
behavior of the generic firms. Especially suspicious is the practice of
listing patents of questionable validity in the Orange Book to keep ge-
neric firms off the market." This allows the branded firms to maintain
their monopoly pricing and extract greater profits from society as a
whole.55 This opportunistic behavior, focused on extracting rents from
society, is suspiciously similar to that of the patent troll holding up a
large, established company.
One litigated example of a branded pharmaceutical firm acting like a
patent troll is SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex. 6 In SmithKline Beecham,
the branded pharmaceutical firm originally marketed a form of Paxil
know as anhydrous paroxetine hydrochloride ("anhydrous Paxil").17 It
later found a new form of the same molecule, which will further be re-
ferred to as Paxil hemihydrate.58 While SmithKline Beecham ("SKB")
initially marketed anhydrous Paxil, it later focused on Paxil hemihydrate,
which had the advantage (for SKB) of being protected by a patent.5 9 De-
spite the patent protection for the hemihydrate, SKB faced the
unwelcome prospect of market competition from a generic version of the
bioequivalent anhydrous Paxil. 6° In order to keep the anhydrous Paxil
from the market, SKB sued Apotex for infringement based on the patent
protection for Paxil hemihydrate.6' The scientific details of the theory of
the suit are somewhat obscure, but the general idea was that when SKB
created Paxil hemihydrate, it thereafter became impossible, or nearly
impossible, to produce pure anhydrous Paxil, uncontaminated by Paxil
hemi-hydrate.62 Thus, despite its best efforts, Apotex was unable to pro-
duce anhydrous Paxil without also producing a small amount of the
hemihydrate form.63 Selling anhydrous Paxil contaminated by a small
amount of hemihydrate Paxil thus infringed SKB's patent on the hemi-
hydrate.6' As a result, as long as the patent on the hemihydrate was valid,
SKB could keep the unprotected anhydrate from the market.
54. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Wrongful "Orange Book" Listing
Raises Red Flag with FTC; Leads to Consent Order with Biovail Corp. Concerning its Drug
Tiazac (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/biovaitiazac.htm.
55. Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Fu-
ture Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359, 371-72.
56. SmithKline Beecham, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011.
57. Id. at 1015.
58. Id. at 1017.
59. Id. at 1019, 1023.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1024.
62. For a discussion of the "disappearing polymorph theory," see id. at 1018-25.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1025.
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This behavior is certainly opportunistic, and Judge Posner, sitting by
designation, was bothered by SKB's actions. As a result, he postulated a
number of alternative theories, some quite novel, which allowed Apotex
to escape liability and bring the substantially pure anhydrate to market.
The Federal Circuit initially declined to adopt any of Posner's myriad
approaches and invalidated the SKB patent based on public use.' After
the original opinion was vacated en banc, the court subsequently invali-
dated the patent as inherently anticipated on remand.67
It appears that the court's inclination at each level was that it would
be unfair to enforce SKB's patent. This is not dissimilar from the rea-
soning of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in eBay.69 In fact, Judge
Posner used very similar reasoning in his district court opinion.70 Thus, it
is entirely possible that pharmaceutical firms opposed the eBay outcome
because they are, on occasion, actually patent trolls in sheep's clothing.
65. Id. at 1025-52.
66. SmithKline Beecham, 365 E3d at 1321.
67. SmithKline Beecham, 403 E3d at 1346. The reasoning in this opinion was strongly
criticized by Judge Newman, who claimed the court was severely misconstruing the law.
SmithKline Beecham, 403 E3d at 1329.
68. Judge Posner, however, was the only one to openly explain what he was doing. In
crafting an equitable defense against infringement by the disappearing polymorphs, Posner
made the following statement:
Apotex gains nothing from the seeding of its plant .... [I]f you are trying to make
anhydrate, any hemihydrate that gets into it is an impurity .... The only possible
effect of preventing the alleged infringement would be to perpetuate an expired pat-
ent (patent 196, which expired more than a decade ago) by making it impossible for
Apotex to manufacture a formerly patented substance that is now in the public do-
main.
SmithKline Beecham, 247 E Supp. 2d at 1043-45. Posner also observed that "the patented
product on which the claim of infringement is based has been so changed that it is no longer
the same invention. The hemihydrate that is found in small quantities in the anhydrate is not
the same invention covered by patent 723; it is merely an impurity." Id. at 1045 (emphasis
added).
69. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) ("When the
patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce...
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction
may not serve the public interest.") (emphasis added).
70. Justice Posner explained that an injunction "is not to provide relief when damages
are known to be zero. To provide relief in such a case would be to invite a form of extortion."
SmithKline Beecham, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. Posner also argued that "any injury that
SmithKline sustains from the fact that minute amounts of its product creep into Apotex's ge-
neric product will be due not to the invasion of any interest that patent law protects, but merely
to the fact that the existence of a public-domain substitute for a patented product injures the
patentee by providing competition." Id. at 1048.
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C. The Pharmaceutical Firm as Innovator:
eBay's Disparate Impact
SmithKline Beecham illustrates that, at times, pharmaceutical firms
engage in the type of opportunistic behavior practiced by patent trolls.7'
These firms, however, have a much more important, and compelling,
reason for resisting judicially imposed damages instead of mandatory
injunctions. A pharmaceutical firm with a valid patent can maximize its
profits by charging the monopoly price. Any price, either higher or
lower, results in decreased profits.72 Presumably, the firm anticipates the
future monopoly profits and chooses to invest the appropriate amount in
developing a drug.73
Now imagine if a court, instead of granting the pharmaceutical firm
an injunction, chooses to award damages in the form of an ongoing roy-
alty payment. Due to an asymmetry of information, it is highly unlikely
that the court, or for that matter, the jury, will choose to award exactly
the monopoly price as an award for damages. Whether the court chooses
to set the royalty at a level higher or lower than the monopoly price, the
firm will make less than if it were awarded an injunction. Therefore, it is
almost certain that the pharmaceutical firm will receive less than what
they expected when they chose to innovate. The result is that eBay could
have a dampening effect on innovation in the pharmaceutical industry."
The royalty-setting problem is particularly acute in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, where a single product might be protected by a single
patent. Here, the very same situation that created a holdup problem for
eBay works to its advantage. Think back to the hypothetical situation
described above, where eBay produces a product using ten patented
components equally. Since there are multiple components, the profit de-
rived from any individual patented part is only a fraction of the profit
from the completed product. When faced with a patent troll holdup, the
profit is drained from all of the other components of the product. When
faced with a royalty rate that deviates from the maximum because of the
court's inability to accurately determine damages, however, eBay stands
to lose far less than a pharmaceutical firm. Even if the court grants a
royalty-free license, eBay has lost, at most, only one-tenth of the overall
profits. Thus, given the benefits gained from the protection from patent
71. This behavior is only encouraged by the prospect of a thirty-month stay based on
the relevant FDCA provisions. Id. at 1048-49. See also supra notes 54-55.
72. This is because the monopoly price is, by definition, profit-maximizing. Thus, any
other price will lead to decreased profits.
73. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 36, at 1600-04 (discussing the prospect theory of
the patent system).
74. This assumes, of course, that courts would start awarding damages instead of in-
junctions to plaintiffs in pharmaceutical patent infringement suits.
Patent Trolls
trolls, it is likely that eBay would not be adverse to a court setting a roy-
alty if one of its patents was infringed.
CONCLUSION
Pharmaceutical firms sided with patent trolls in eBay for a number
of reasons. In part, the explanation lies in their desire to opportunisti-
cally exploit the power of an injunction. This behavior looks like the
behavior of a patent troll and should not be encouraged. On the other
hand, moving away from an automatic injunction will almost certainly
reduce the incentive for pharmaceutical firms to innovate, especially as
compared to firms in other areas. Thus, eBay creates a disparate impact
across industries on the incentive to innovate. Courts must consider both
the incentive to innovate provided by patents and the harm to society
resulting from the associated monopoly when deciding whether to grant
an injunction. Ultimately, the way that courts apply eBay to different
industries will help determine whether the pharmaceutical firms' support
of MercExchange was warranted.
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